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regarded as harmful if firms compete in quantities. This, however, 
ignores dynamic effects. We show that an MQS can hinder 
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depend even more on the market at hand than has been 
acknowledged. 
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 1 Introduction
Deliberately high or low quality choices are a common strategy used by oligopolistic ¯rms
in order to relax competition and raise pro¯ts (Shaked and Sutton 1982). As was ¯rst
demonstrated by Ronnen (1991), regulatory authorities may in such cases increase welfare
by imposing a minimum quality standard (MQS). In particular, a suitably chosen MQS
can simultaneously reduce hedonic prices and lift average quality.
The circumstances under which an MQS actually increases rather than reduces total
surplus have been investigated by a number of authors. Broadly speaking, a moderate
MQS is predicted to be socially bene¯cial if ¯rms compete in prices; it is detrimental if
¯rms compete in quantities. This dichotomy is true, however, only in static environments.
The danger of collusion on price or quantity possibly changes the picture because an
MQS a®ects the critical degree of patience which allows anti-competitive behavior to be
sustained as an equilibrium. It is known, for example, that an MQS can facilitate collusion
in a Bertrand setting (HÄ ackner 1994). This questions an MQS's generally positive e®ect
under price competition.
In this paper, we show that the generally negative e®ect of an MQS under quantity
competition (Valletti 2000) is similarly sensitive to the precise market structure at hand.
Namely, imposition of a suitable MQS can destabilize collusion in a Cournot setting. The
usual static costs of an MQS hence need to be traded o® against dynamic bene¯ts. We
show that the latter may outweigh the former, i.e., an MQS can actually raise total surplus
under Cournot competition. Moreover, this anti-collusive e®ect of an MQS is fairly robust:
in contrast to the case of Bertrand competition, it does not depend on whether quality
primarily a®ects ¯xed or variable costs.
We will ¯rst brie°y survey previous investigations of the welfare e®ect of an MQS.
Section 3 then reviews the baseline model of vertical di®erentiation with an MQS and
Section 4 quanti¯es the static welfare properties of an MQS. Its role in preventing collusion
when quality a®ects ¯xed costs is investigated in Section 5; the case when quality a®ects
variable costs and alternative collusion scenarios are dealt with in Section 6. Section 7
concludes.
2 Related Literature
Ronnen (1991) was the ¯rst to demonstrate how an MQS can (a) raise the qualities provided
and (b) reduce the gap between both ¯rms' qualities in a Bertrand duopoly with endogenous
qualities. E®ect (a) counters the tendency of quality under-provision without regulation
(¯rms cater to their respective marginal customer, not the average one; Spence 1975);
and (b) curbs excess di®erentiation intended to alleviate competition. Both increase total
surplus.
The reduction in the equilibrium level of di®erentiation in Ronnen's model is driven by
1¯xed costs of production which are assumed to be convex and increasing in quality. Price
changes due to the introduction of an MQS are thus not caused by changes in marginal
costs but simply better substitutability of products. In particular, the ratio of price and
quality { the so-called hedonic price { falls for both products.
As Crampes and Hollander (1995) have highlighted, hedonic prices need not fall in
general, e.g., if quality also a®ects variable costs. It turns out to be crucial for a positive
welfare e®ect of the MQS that it decreases the quality gap between products. If unit costs
fail to rise su±ciently more for the high-quality producer than for the low-quality pro-
ducer as each one increases its respective unregulated quality, then an MQS may actually
enlarge the quality gap and reduce total surplus. In this case, gains to the low-quality
producer (for whom an MQS creates valuable commitment under Bertrand competition)
are outweighed by losses to the high-quality producer and to consumers with relatively low
quality preference (namely, greater cost plus greater di®erentiation raise prices by more
than the respective willingness to pay for extra quality).1 However, for a great variety
of cost functions, aggregate consumer surplus and with it total surplus tends to increase
when a moderate MQS is introduced to a Bertrand oligopoly.
The situation is di®erent under quantity competition. As Valletti (2000) has shown, a
binding MQS reduces pro¯ts for both producers and moreover decreases market coverage.
The extra surplus to consumers with high willingness to pay for quality dominates the loss
to those who drop out of the market or keep consuming the low-quality good at a higher
hedonic price, i.e., aggregate consumer surplus increases. The net welfare e®ect of the MQS
is still negative. The reason is that when ¯rms compete µ a la Cournot, their need to alleviate
competition is relatively weak, and hence the unregulated quality gap is not particularly
excessive. The intensi¯cation of competition identi¯ed by Crampes and Hollander (1995)
as the key factor behind welfare gains from an MQS is also rather subdued; its e®ect is
dominated by the reduction of pro¯ts and of the surplus generated with consumers of low
or moderate willingness to pay for quality.
HÄ ackner (1994) pointed to another detrimental e®ect associated with an MQS: it can
increase the stability of collusion. In the market structure considered by HÄ ackner, notably
with exogenous qualities a®ecting only the ¯xed costs of production, it is easier to sustain
collusion the more similar are ¯rms' products. Intuitively, higher competitive pro¯ts which
accrue to the high-quality ¯rm for a greater level of di®erentiation make potential gains
from collusion less attractive and give it a greater incentive to deviate. What is bene¯cial
from a static perspective can thus be harmful in a dynamic context.
However, details matter { in particular the cost structure. In contrast to HÄ ackner's
study, Ecchia and Lambertini (1997) assume that variable costs rise with quality. The
1Unlike Ronnen (1991), Crampes and Hollander assume that the market is always fully covered, i.e.,
consumers either buy the high or the low-quality good. If some do not buy at all, then a higher hedonic
price of the low-quality good also diminishes total market coverage and thereby surplus.
2Fixed quality costs Variable quality costs









































Table 1: E®ects of a MQS on welfare for di®erent market structures
pro¯t advantage to the high-quality producer is then no longer very pronounced;2 it is also
less sensitive to an MQS. But the MQS makes products closer substitutes and thus creates
bigger scope to raise pro¯ts by a unilateral deviation. In summary, Ecchia and Lambertini
¯nd that an MQS decreases rather than increases the stability of collusion, i.e., it can be
bene¯cial both from a static and a dynamic perspective.3
Our own analysis concentrates on the case of quantity competition and completes the
three cells at the bottom right of Table 1. While there are static losses, as already identi¯ed
by Valletti (2000), independently of whether quality a®ects ¯xed or variable costs, collusion
becomes more di±cult to sustain with an MQS: available total collusion pro¯ts are reduced
by the cost increases induced by the MQS. This { aided by a weakened bargaining position
of the critical high-quality ¯rm { makes it relatively more attractive to go it alone.
3 Model
We consider a standard vertically di®erentiated duopoly.4 Firm i 2 f1;2g produces an
indivisible good of quality si. Without loss of generality we assume s1 ¸ s2 > 0. A unit
mass of consumers obtain utility
U(pi;si) = µ ¢ si ¡ pi (1)
2See Lehmann-Grube (1997) on the robustness of this high-quality advantage.
3Also see Boom (1995) and Bonroy (2003) on the impact of an MQS on international trade. { Re-
cent empirical evaluations of an MQS include Chitpy and Witte (1997) and Hotz and Xiao (2005), both
analyzing data on the market for child care.
4See Tirole (1988, Section 7.5), Choi and Shin (1992), Motta (1993) and Wauthy (1996).
3from buying exactly one unit of quality si at price pi and zero otherwise; µ characterizes
the considered consumer's type. It is assumed to be uniformly distributed on [0;a] (a > 0).
A consumer with type µ =
p1¡p2
s1¡s2 is indi®erent between both products; one with µ =
p2
s2
is indi®erent between the low-quality product 2 and no purchase at all. This implies the
inverse demand functions
p1(x1;x2;s1;s2) = s1 (a ¡ x1) ¡ s2 x2;
p2(x1;x2;s1;s2) = s2 (a ¡ x1 ¡ x2)
(2)
with xi ¸ 0 denoting the respective quantity choice.
Firms have access to the same technology. Their production is initially assumed to
involve only ¯xed costs, which increase in quality and are denoted by C(si). In line with
most of the literature, we consider the simple quadratic form
C(si) = °s
2
i (° > 0): (3)
The timing of interaction is as follows: First, both ¯rms simultaneously choose their
respective quality, which then becomes common knowledge. Second, the ¯rms simultane-
ously decide on their quantities. Finally, the market is cleared at the prices indicated by
(2).5
Firms' equilibrium quantity choices for given qualities s1 ¸ s2 are
^ x1(s1;s2) =
a (2s1 ¡ s2)
4s1 ¡ s2




They de¯ne the reduced pro¯t functions
¼1(s1;s2) =




























2 (4s1 + s2)
(4s1 ¡ s2)
3 ¡ 2°s2 = 0: (8)
These conditions de¯ne ¯rms' best response functions Ri(sj) (i 6= j 2 f1;2g); closed-form
solutions exist but are very unwieldy. The resulting unregulated equilibrium qualities can
5In the spirit of Kreps and Scheinkmann (1983), one may think of capacity choices and subsequent
price competition. In the context of inde¯nitely repeated interaction, which we will study below, this
interpretation requires, however, that ¯rms can regularly revise their capacities (e.g., with each agricultural









Now suppose that ~ s is exogenously imposed as an MQS, i.e., ¯rms face the constraint
si ¸ ~ s.7 We will throughout our analysis focus on the case in which the MQS is not
excessive but binding: both ¯rms stay in the market,8 but ¯rm 2 needs to increase its
quality in order to comply with regulation, i.e., ~ s > ^ s2. The resulting regulated equilibrium
qualities will be denoted by s¤
1(~ s) and s¤
2(~ s).
Lemma 1 implies that the equilibrium quality gap between both ¯rms decreases in ~ s if
¯rm 2 adopts the mandated quality, i.e., supposing that s¤
2(~ s) = ~ s:
Lemma 1 Firm 1 responds to any given increase ¢s2 of ¯rm 2's quality by an increase





Proof: Substituting s2 ´ t ¢ s1 with t 2 (0;1] in (7), the ¯rst-order condition for ¯rm 1's
quality choice can equivalently be written as
s1 =
a2(t3 ¡ 4t2 + 12t ¡ 16)
2°(t ¡ 4)3 : (10)
Moreover, application of the implicit function theorem to equation (7) and afterwards the





4a2(t ¡ 1)t2 ¡ (t ¡ 4)4°s1
: (11)





t4 ¡ 16t3 + 36t2 ¡ 64t + 64
: (12)





Lemma 2 establishes that indeed s¤
2(~ s) = ~ s:
6There exists a quality s2 2 (0;s1) which is pro¯table for ¯rm 2 for any given quality s1, i.e., there
is no monopoly in equilibrium. Second-order conditions are satis¯ed and neither ¯rm has an incentive to
\leapfrog". This remains true after an MQS is imposed (see Appendix A). See Motta (1993) for a detailed
comparison of (^ s1; ^ s2) under price vs. quantity competition and ¯xed vs. variable quality costs.
7See Argenton (2006) and Lutz et al. (2000) for analysis of an endogenous MQS. Argenton analyzes
bilateral bargaining over an MQS by the duopolists. Lutz et al. allow one of them to in°uence the MQS
by a prior quality commitment.
8Firm 2's pro¯t is the smaller one, decreases in ~ s, and is zero at ~ sc ¼ 0:09334a
2
° . So \not excessive"
means ~ s · ~ sc.
5Lemma 2 Given an MQS ~ s > ^ s2 such that both ¯rms stay in the market, ¯rm 2 selects
exactly the mandated quality in equilibrium, i.e.,
s
¤
2(~ s) = ~ s:
Proof: Again using the notation s2 ´ t ¢ s1 with t 2 (0;1], the change of ¯rm 2's pro¯t




a2(4 + t) + 2t(t ¡ 4)3°s1
(4 ¡ t)3 (14)





a2(t4 ¡ 4t3 + 12t2 ¡ 15t + 4)
(4 ¡ t)3 ; (15)
which is positive (negative) to the left (right) of t = ^ s2=^ s1.
Imposition of ~ s means that s2 rises by ¢s ¸ ~ s ¡ ^ s2. By Lemma 1, s1 rises by less
than ¢s. A post-MQS equilibrium quality ratio must hence satisfy t > ^ s2=^ s1. Thus (15)
is negative and ¯rm 2 must select the minimum feasible quality s¤
2(~ s) = ~ s in equilibrium.
¤









2 (^ s2=^ s1;1] (16)
is a strictly increasing function of ~ s. With slight abuse of notation, one can hence directly
consider ®, as shorthand for ®(~ s), as being the relevant policy variable.
4 Static Welfare Analysis
The static e®ects of an MQS on pro¯ts, consumer surplus and total surplus in case of ¯xed
quality costs and quantity competition have ¯rst been analyzed by Valletti (2000). For the
sake of completeness, we here include derivations of his two main ¯ndings.9 In contrast to
the price competition case, both producers are made worse o® by the MQS:





< 0 for i 2 f1;2g: (17)
9Valletti's results apply to more general ¯xed quality cost functions C(¢) with C0(¢);C00(¢) > 0. We
investigate the slightly more tedious case of variable quality costs { which is not covered by Valletti { in
Section 6.3.
6Proof: The marginal pro¯t changes caused by introduction of an MQS are given by































2 (s2 ¡ 2s1)
(4s1 ¡ s2)
3 < 0: (20)
Moreover, we know
@R1(~ s)
@~ s > 0 from Lemma 1 and
@¼2
@s2 < 0 from the proof of Lemma 2. It







3 < 0: (21)
¤










(µs1 ¡ p1)dµ (22)
=
a2 s1 (4s1
2 + s1 s2 ¡ s2
2)
2(4s1 ¡ s2)2 : (23)














where we know that
@R1(~ s)
@~ s > 0 and, using (23), one can check that @S
@si > 0 for i 2 f1;2g.
So consumer surplus rises in ~ s.
Its increase is, however, dominated by the decrease of pro¯ts:
Proposition 2 Total surplus decreases in the level of the MQS, i.e.,
d
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@~ s | {z }
2(0;0:05465]
a2 (4s1
























2 + 2s1 s2 + s2
2)
20(4s1 ¡ s2)
2 < 0; (29)
7where
@¼2
@s2 < 0 because constraint s2 ¸ ~ s binds.
¤
The key di®erence to Ronnen's (1991) Bertrand setting is that in the Cournot case { in
view of relatively low competitive pressure even for undi®erentiated goods { the MQS does
not decrease hedonic prices. Hence, consumers with relatively low marginal willingness
to pay for quality leave the market or switch from the high to the low quality, weighing
down the overall increase in consumer surplus. A second distinction is that the MQS tends
to give the low-quality ¯rm valuable commitment power under price competition, i.e., it
bene¯ts from the constraint s2 ¸ ~ s in equilibrium. Here, both ¯rms su®er (Proposition 1).
These di®erences jointly reverse Ronnen's ¯nding of a welfare increase.
5 Dynamic Welfare Analysis
By changing ¯rms' static pro¯ts, an MQS also a®ects their incentives to collude. We will
investigate a market environment in which quantities may be repeatedly set in periods
t = 0;1;2;::: Quality choices are made in period t = ¡1 and then become irreversible.
We assume that the associated ¯xed costs of production are incurred in every period (e.g.,
maintenance of physical or human capital, advertising, licenses). Firms care about their





where ¼i;t denotes ¯rm i's pro¯t in period t. For simplicity we assume that both ¯rms apply
the same discount factor ± 2 (0;1), which may capture pure impatience (determined, e.g.,
by an interest rate) as well as the likelihood that there is in fact another round of quantity
competition between the considered two ¯rms.
It will initially be assumed that ¯rms can transfer pro¯ts from one to the other if
they decide to collude { e.g., by trading a costless intermediate good at an in°ated price.
Situations without the possibility of side payments will be dealt with in Section 6.2. In
either case, we take collusion to only a®ect ¯rms' short-term quantity decisions { not the
initial choice of quality.10
The standard measure of instability of collusion for inde¯nitely repeated interaction is
the maximal discount factor such that, for both ¯rms, the short-run gains from a deviation
outweigh anticipated long-run losses from consequent punishment. We refer to it as the
critical discount factor, denoted by r. In line with HÄ ackner (1994) and Ecchia and Lamber-
tini (1997), punishment is taken to be a reversion to the static Cournot-Nash equilibrium
(which corresponds to a subgame-perfect equilibrium involving simple trigger strategies),
10Collusion on quality would entail a signi¯cant hold-up problem for ¯xed quality costs: total pro¯t is
maximized by setting s2 = 0 in t = ¡1, but then ¯rm 2 would be deprived of all punishment opportunity.
8even though more severe punishments exist.11
Comparison of the anticipation of a collusion pro¯t ¼c
i in every period t = 0;1;::: and
of once receiving the deviation pro¯t ¼d
i and thereafter the punishment payo® ¼
p
i shows
that ¯rm i has an incentive to collude with ¯rm j if and only if









So the critical discount factor is r = maxfr1;r2g.




i for given quality choices s1 and s2, and later replace
si by the respective regulated equilibrium level s¤
i(~ s) in order to analyze the e®ect of
increases of ~ s. For Nash reversion equilibria, the punishment payo® ¼
p
i(s1;s2) is simply the
reduced pro¯t displayed in equation (5) and (6), respectively. Collusion pro¯ts ¼c
i(s1;s2)
are assumed to result from, ¯rst, ¯rms choosing quantities such that their aggregate per
period pro¯t, ¼§, is maximal and, second, bargaining over the division of ¼§. Regarding
the latter, ¯rms are supposed to \split the di®erence" between total competitive and total
collusive pro¯ts equally { in line with Nash's (1950) and, in fact, any symmetric and e±cient
cooperative bargaining solution (e.g., the proportional solution or the one proposed by
Kalai and Smorodinsky 1975).12 We will consider alternatives in Sections 6.1 and 6.2.
Aggregate pro¯t equals
p1(x1;x2;s1;s2) ¢ x1 + p2(x1;x2;s1;s2) ¢ x2 ¡ C(s1) ¡ C(s2) (32)
and is maximized by xc
1 = a
2 and xc
2 = 0: the ¯rms will eliminate any competition and
produce only the quality s1, which has a higher margin. We assume that ¯rm 2 incurs
¯xed costs C(s2) even if its current output is zero; namely, the ¯rm needs to retain its






2 ¡ ° s2
2: (33)
Splitting the di®erence





a2 s1 s2 (4s1 ¡ 3s2)
4(4s1 ¡ s2)
2 > 0 (34)














11See Abreu (1986). One might try to replace the discount factor which ensures existence of collusive
Cournot-Nash reversion equilibria by one ensuring existence of (symmetric) optimal punishment equilibria
with speci¯ed minimal collusion payo®s. Another option would be to consider any particular discount
factor ± and investigate how maximal collusive payo®s are a®ected by an MQS. Neither path has, to our
knowledge, been pursued in the literature so far.
12As demonstrated by Binmore (1987), the Nash solution also approximates non-cooperative alternating-
o®ers bargaining between patient players in single-shot interaction (see Rubinstein 1982). Repeated inter-
action would support alternative divisions but our results continue to hold for many other division rules















A deviation by ¯rm i involves a best response to ¯rm j's collusive output xc
j and a
refusal to share any part of its pro¯ts. While ¯rm 1 is bound by its quantity choice for
the current period, we assume that it can immediately react to 2's deviation by refusing
to share pro¯ts. This implies that ¯rm 2's incentive to collude is actually independent of
discount factor ±:








2, ¯rm 2's pro¯t equals
p2(x
c








and is maximized by xd
2 = a














2 (8s1 ¡ s2)
16(4s1 ¡ s2)2 < 0: (40)







So only ¯rm 1's incentive to collude or, respectively, to deviate needs to be considered
(and only ±1 would matter if ¯rm-speci¯c discount factors ±i were applied). In view of
xc
2 = 0, the jointly pro¯t-maximizing quantity xc
1 = a
2 in fact maximizes ¯rm 1's pro¯t. A
deviation by ¯rm 1 thus boils down to refusing to transfer the designated share of pro¯ts








We are now ready to prove our main result:
































































@~ s < 0 r "
Table 2: Partial e®ects of an increase of MQS ~ s on the critical discount factor r





equations (5), (35), and (41)) into (31) yields




Replacing si by the regulated equilibrium quality s¤
i(~ s) and then using the substitution
®(~ s) = s¤
2(~ s)=s¤










®(~ s) ¡ 4
3®(~ s) ¡ 8
´ ½(®(~ s)): (44)















An MQS can hence be an e®ective policy to prevent collusion between vertically di®er-
























is the negative impact on ¯rm 1's collusion pro¯t ¼c
1 caused by a drop of ¼§. Table 2
decomposes and ranks (by arrow size) the involved partial e®ects. As we have seen, the
MQS induces both ¯rms to produce higher qualities. Therefore both incur increased ¯xed
costs, which are partially o®set by positive sales of only one quality in case of collusion. This
reduces the aggregate collusion pro¯t ¼§ which is available for distribution signi¯cantly.
As a consequence, ¼c




1 { the critical discount factor rises on balance.13
13Interestingly, ¯rm 1's relative share of the diminished total pro¯t ¼§ drops under Nash bargaining.
The reason is that its competitive pro¯t (and thus its fallback position) falls by more than that of ¯rm 2.
This indirect e®ect of the MQS on the relative attractiveness of collusion is not crucial for r's upward
slope, but explains a greater steepness under Nash bargaining than for situations in which, say, ¯rm 1 can
keep the entire di®erence ¼¢ (see Section 6.1).
11Note that prevention of collusion by an MQS involves a trade-o®: while competitive
quantity decisions create surplus relative to collusive ones, ¯rms' quality choices under an
MQS destroy surplus (cf. Proposition 2). There exist an interval of discount factors for
which the net e®ect on surplus is positive:
Proposition 4 Assume that ¯rms collude whenever this is strictly more pro¯table than a
deviation and subsequent reversion to the Cournot-Nash equilibrium (i.e., for ± > r). Then
a welfare-enhancing MQS exists if and only if ± 2 (±
¡; ¹ ±) for ±
¡ ¼ 0:78878 and ¹ ± ¼ 0:82537.
Proof: Collusive behavior in the unregulated case generates a total surplus of
^ W














^ s1 ¡ ° ^ s
2
1 ¡ ° ^ s
2
2 (48)
per period, which exceeds total surplus under collusion for any regulated equilibrium qual-
ity ratio ® > ^ ®.
Competitive behavior in the presence of an MQS entails smaller pro¯ts but greater




1 ¡ 5s1s2 + s2
2)









2(~ s) in Figure 1
together with the analogous surplus W col(®) for collusive behavior (with W col(^ ®) ´ ^ W col).
Any regulated quality ratio exceeding ¹ ® de¯ned by W com(¹ ®) = ^ W col lowers welfare
independently of the unregulated market conduct. In contrast, a regulated quality ratio
® 2 (^ ®; ¹ ®) implies greater surplus if it replaces collusive by competitive behavior. By
assumption the latter requires the actual discount factor ± to be no greater than the critical






denote the critical discount factor for a regulated
quality ratio ® (cf. equation (44)), it follows that a welfare-enhancing MQS exists whenever
0:78878 ¼ ½(^ ®) ´ ±
¡ < ± < ¹ ± ´ ½(¹ ®) ¼ 0:82537: (50)
¤
The range of discount factors ± such that a suitable MQS raises total surplus is small.
Even though we only consider a simple model of a market without claim to numerical
relevance, this suggests caution if prevention of collusion should be the only motivation for
an MQS in practical applications. Still, a large set of, e.g., interest rate and continuation
probability combinations will lead to ± 2 (±
¡; ¹ ±). In such cases, the realized welfare gain
depends on the selected MQS. For example, an MQS slightly below the level ¹ s ¼ 0:07888a2
°
which corresponds to an equilibrium quality ratio ¹ ® will rather robustly prevent collusion
12Figure 1: Total surplus under competition and collusion
Figure 2: Optimal MQS for given discount factor
13but entails only a negligible surplus increase relative to an unregulated market. The optimal
or surplus-maximizing MQS for di®erent discount factors ± is illustrated in Figure 2. It
realizes the dynamic bene¯t of collusion prevention at the smallest static cost:




a2 (3 ¡ 4±)(44±3 ¡ 120±2 + 99± ¡ 27)
24° ±3 (2± ¡ 1)
(51)
for ± 2 (±
¡; ¹ ±), and zero or not binding otherwise.
Proof: Since the static welfare loss of an MQS is increasing continuously in ~ s, the optimal
choice of ~ s is such that the resulting regulated equilibrium quality ratio ® satis¯es
½(®) = ± () ® =
4 (3 ¡ 4±)
3 (1 ¡ 2±)
: (52)
Pro¯t-maximizing behavior by ¯rm 1 entails
s1(®) =
a2(®3 ¡ 4®2 + 12® ¡ 16)
2°(® ¡ 4)3 (53)
(substitute t = ® in equation (10)). Recall, moreover, that s¤
2(~ s) = ~ s for any non-excessive
~ s, i.e., ¯rm 2 maximizes pro¯ts by selecting the minimum feasible quality (Lemma 2). So
any MQS ~ s with corresponding equilibrium quality ratio ® satis¯es ~ s = ®¢s1(®) and, using




a2 (3 ¡ 4±)(44±3 ¡ 120±2 + 99± ¡ 27)
24° ±3 (2± ¡ 1)
(54)
¤
One can distinguish three di®erent regulation regimes: for low discount factors (region 1
in Figure 2), i.e., when ¯rms place great weight on current relative to prospective future
pro¯ts, collusion would be unstable even without regulation; an MQS could only destroy
surplus. For intermediate discount factors (region 2), an MQS would prevent collusion and
thereby create gains exceeding the static welfare losses ¯rst identi¯ed by Valletti (2000).
Finally, for high discount factors (region 3), the costs of prevention would either exceed
the respective bene¯ts or collusion cannot be prevented by an MQS at all.14
6 Extensions
In the baseline collusion scenario, the low quality producer receives half of the di®erence
between total competitive pro¯ts and the maximal aggregate pro¯t; then it always prefers
collusion to a deviation. With this in mind, consider a situation in which the critical
14The latter is the case for ± > ±c ¼ 0:84366: the implied MQS would be excessive.
14discount factor r is slightly above ¯rms' discount factor ±, i.e., collusion as investigated in
Section 5 would not be stable. It is at least conceivable { and in our view quite likely {
that the low quality producer o®ers part of its designated equal split to the high quality
producer, i.e., the ¯rms settle for a lower side payment, raise ¯rm 1's collusion payo®, and
push the critical discount factor below ±. Both ¯rms would thus be better o® relative to
otherwise unavoidable competition.
This questions the rather standard application of a ¯xed division rule such as Nash
bargaining to the static collusion rent in our model. Its replacement by the (present value
of the) dynamic stream of rents is, however, also problematic: it presupposes the very
stability of collusion which is being investigated. We therefore suggest to consider the
minimal critical discount factor which is achievable for any conceivable division rule as
an alternative indicator of the stability of collusion. We consider its reaction to an MQS
in the next subsection. Afterwards, attention will be turned to possible collusion without
side payments, and ¯nally the case of variable quality costs.
Obviously, many other extensions or variations are possible. For example, consumers'
preferences could be modi¯ed in analogy to Kuhn (2007), the number of active ¯rms might
be increased as in Scarpa (1998), or the timing of the quality choices could be varied as in
Constantatos and Perrakis (1998). We conjecture that such modi¯cations would qualify
some statements (e.g., regarding the change of consumer surplus), but not reverse the basic
anti-collusive e®ect of the MQS.
6.1 Minimal critical discount factor











2(s1;s2) + (1 ¡ q) ¢ ¼¢(s1;s2) (56)
for some q 2 [0;1] and the given rent ¼¢(s1;s2). The critical discount factor of the high
quality producer can with that be written as
½1(®;q) =
8 ¡ 4q ¡ 3® + 3q ®
8 ¡ 3®
(57)
for any regulated quality ratio ®. Note that
@½1(®;q)
@q = 4¡3®
3®¡8 < 0, i.e., raising ¯rm 1's
aggregate pro¯ts facilitates and stabilizes collusion. The critical discount factor is smallest
(and collusion easiest to maintain) if q is chosen to be maximal under the constraint that


















15Inequality (58) happens to be true for all q 2 [0;1]. The minimal critical discount factor
such that collusion can be maintained by Nash reversion strategies under any solution to
the bargaining problem between both ¯rms hence evaluates to
½




It follows that the minimal critical discount factor increases when a moderate MQS is
imposed (
@½¤(®)
@® > 0). The anti-collusive e®ect of an MQS therefore does not hinge on
the { in our dynamic context somewhat problematic { assumption of Nash bargaining; it
is very robust with respect to the division of collusion rents.
6.2 Collusion without side payments
We have so far assumed that ¯rms can collude rather explicitly: they pick the total pro¯t-
maximizing production plan and then organize side payments. Especially the latter seems
problematic: it would provide antitrust authorities with hard and accessible evidence in
legal proceedings. This might make the use of second-best policies against collusion, such
as the investigated use of an MQS, unnecessary. It is therefore relevant that an MQS can
also prevent tacit collusion without side payments.
We maintain the assumption that ¯rms' try to maximize total pro¯ts
p1(x1;x2;s1;s2) ¢ x1 + p2(x1;x2;s1;s2) ¢ x2 ¡ C(s1) ¡ C(s2) (60)
but suppose that side payments are replaced by coordinated quantity choices. The collusive
quantity choices xc
1 and xc
2 must result in pro¯ts which exceed the respective competitive
pro¯t ¼
p
i(s1;s2) for either ¯rm. As in the previous subsection, we consider the surplus
shares that yield the minimal critical discount factor.
In particular, we maximize (60) subject to the constraint
¼
c
2(x1;x2;s1;s2) ´ p2(x1;x2;s1;s2) ¢ x2 ¡ C(s2) = z ¢ ¼
p
2(s1;s2) (61)
for a given z ¸ 1. The unwieldy solution determines collusion pro¯ts ¼c
i(z) and { computing
the respective best responses { deviation pro¯ts ¼d
i (z). For a given imposed collusion
pro¯tability z for ¯rm 2, we thus obtain expressions for ½1(®;z) and ½2(®;z) such that
½(®;z) ´ maxf½1(®;z);½2(®;z)g (62)
is the critical discount factor. Minimization of ½(®;z) with respect to z ¸ 1 then yields the
minimal critical discount factor such that collusion can be maintained by Nash reversion
equilibria.15 It is worth noting that the respective minimizer z¤ is strictly greater than 1:
¯rm 1's collusion quantity is much smaller than the old xc
1 = a
2 in Section 5; ¯rm 2 would
deviate to a bigger quantity if it were kept at its competitive pro¯t.
15The constraint ¼§(x1;x2;s1;s2) ¡ z ¢ ¼c
2(s1;s2) ¸ ¼
p
2(s1;s2) is automatically taken care of: any too







Figure 3: Critical discount factor without side payments
The minimal critical discount factor for given quality ratio, ½(®), is illustrated in Fig-
ure 3. We ¯nd that the imposition of an MQS (corresponding to ® > ^ ®) robustly makes
collusion harder. The indicated bene¯cial dynamic e®ect of an MQS is no artifact of a
particular form of collusion and remains e®ective when ¯rst-best policies { namely, en-
forcement of a legal ban { are di±cult to implement.
6.3 Variable quality costs
We ¯nally consider the case in which quality a®ects variable costs { for instance, because
greater quality requires more expensive raw materials, specialized labor, more time, etc.
Appendix B contains formal derivations of the reported results.




without ¯xed costs. For given qualities s1 ¸ s2, the equilibrium quantities are
^ x1(s1;s2) =
2as1 ¡ 2° s1





s1 (a + ° s1 ¡ 2° s2)
4s1 ¡ s2
(65)
17and result in the reduced pro¯ts
¼1(s1;s2) =


















As in the case of ¯xed quality costs, ¯rm 2 chooses s¤
2(~ s) = ~ s if the constraint si ¸ ~ s is









2 (^ s2=^ s1;1] (69)











> 0; ~ s < ~ sl
< 0; ~ s > ~ sl (71)
with ~ sl ¼ 0:29443a
° . In contrast to the case of ¯xed quality costs, the low quality producer
may now bene¯t from an MQS: the latter may create a valuable commitment to o®ering
a relatively high quality with greater margins dominating the implied quantity reduction
(as for Bertrand competition).






> 0; ~ s < ~ sm
< 0; ~ s > ~ sm (72)
with ~ sm ¼ 0:29887a
° . Whereas the MQS had only an indirect demand e®ect on prices in the
¯xed cost case, higher qualities also raise variable costs here and thus potentially reduce
total consumer surplus. It is hence not surprising that, as before, total surplus decreases
in the level of the MQS, i.e.,
d(¼1(¢) + ¼2(¢) + S(¢))
d~ s
< 0: (73)
So the static net e®ect of an MQS on surplus is again disadvantageous. We are, how-
ever, interested mainly in the potential long-run e®ects of an MQS. Retaining the Nash

















s1 s2 (3a2 + 3°2 s1
2 ¡ 8a° s2 + 5°2 s2
2 + ° s1 (2a ¡ 5° s2))
32s1 ¡ 8s2
(75)
with, in contrast to the baseline situation of Section 5, both products on o®er. It also turns
out that both ¯rms face a short-term temptation to cheat. The corresponding deviation















We show in Appendix B that the critical discount factor associated with Nash bargaining






< 0; ~ s < ~ sb
> 0; ~ s > ~ sb (78)
with ~ sb ¼ 0:298687a
° > ~ s.
Again a trade o® between static costs and dynamic bene¯ts of an MQS exists: on the
one hand, the MQS destroys surplus by distorting quality choices, but on the other hand it
can prevent or destabilize collusion. In contrast to the benchmark case with ¯xed quality
costs, any MQS which prevents collusion automatically raises total welfare (i.e., whenever
r(~ s) > ± > r(0)). The corresponding interval of discount factors ± is therefore larger;
namely, a welfare-enhancing MQS exists for the case of variable quality costs if ± 2 (±
¡; ¹ ±)
for ±
¡ ¼ 0:543367 and ¹ ± ¼ 0:695238. The optimal MQS is again the respective lowest one
which prevents collusion.
7 Concluding remarks
We have shown that, contrary to received knowledge, an MQS can be welfare-increasing also
if ¯rms compete in quantities. While it robustly lowers the generated total surplus in single-
shot interaction, the quality distortions induced by the MQS reduce the attractiveness of
collusion relative to competitive behavior when ¯rms interact repeatedly. The MQS can
thereby prevent or destabilize collusion, and this creates dynamic bene¯ts. They outweigh
the static costs for a non-negligible range of parameters and the MQS raises total surplus.
This main ¯nding is surprisingly robust. In particular, we have considered side pay-
ments as well as pure quantity coordination, ¯xed quality costs as well as variable quality
costs, the standard measure of collusion stability as well as an alternative that provides
more bargaining °exibility. Having more than two active ¯rms as in Scarpa (1998) is
unlikely to make any signi¯cant di®erence either:16 The static e®ects of the MQS were
16We have con¯rmed this for an example with three ¯rms.
19already negative for a Cournot duopoly. The investigated dynamic e®ects stay bene¯cial,
though the available range of non-excessive MQS is bound to shrink. So we conjecture
that welfare increases remain a generic possibility also in more general oligopoly settings.
Of course, we do not expect our results to hold for all reasonable speci¯cations of
¯rms' costs or consumers' utility (see Kuhn 2007). And, more relevantly, other policy
measures exist which may well be more e®ective and economical than an MQS in preventing
anticompetitive behavior. In general, deterrence by purely legal means seems preferable. It
o®ers authorities a number of decision alternatives to the distorting introduction of a new
MQS or the tightening of an existing one { e.g., lower evidence requirements in antitrust
cases, sti®er penalties, greater investment in detection, or immunity for whistle-blowers.
But, ¯rst, it should not be taken for granted that no or smaller economic distortions are
induced by these (think of lobbying, e®orts of concealment and deception, bribery). And,
second, there may also be other good reasons for the introduction of an MQS { for instance
technological spillovers in mobile telecommunication, consumer protection related to child
safety or public health concerns, strategic trade policy, etc. When the related bene¯ts of
an MQS are compared to the direct welfare losses studied by Valletti (2000), the dynamic
gains identi¯ed here should be taken into account. They might tip the balance in a number
of `marginal' market environments.
The conventional wisdom concerning the merits of an MQS regularly needed updating
in the past. The early investigations emphasized how competition and cost structure
matter; several more recent studies indicate how the baseline results depend on consumers'
preferences, the number of active ¯rms, or the timing of decisions. This paper highlights
the role of the time horizon and the associated market conduct. In particular, we have
found that quality regulation under quantity competition can make sense from a dynamic
perspective. Tempting dichotomous verdicts deserve further quali¯cation.
Appendix A
The second-order condition for ¯rm 1's quality s¤






2 (s2 ¡ s1)
(4s1 ¡ s2)
4 ¡ 2° < 0 (79)
is satis¯ed for all s1 > s2. Further conditions for the boundary point maximum s¤
2(~ s) = ~ s
need not be checked.
The low quality producer has no incentive to leapfrog, i.e., it cannot gain by a deviation
s0
2 ¸ s¤
1(~ s): if the low quality producer chooses s0
2 ¸ s¤












2 (s2 ¡ 2s1)
(4s1 ¡ s2)
3 < 0: (80)
20By Lemma 1, s¤




















The latter term is maximal at s0
2 = 0:12961a2
° and bounded above by ¡0:00186a4
° . So ¯rm 2
cannot attain a positive pro¯t by leapfrogging. Firm 1 cannot leapfrog ¯rm 2 because
s¤
2(~ s) = ~ s.
Appendix B
This appendix considers the case of variable quality costs (without ¯xed costs), namely
unit costs are c(si) = °s2





s1 (¡2as1 + 2° s1
2 + s2 (a ¡ ° s2))
2
(s2 ¡ 4s1)





2 s2 (a + ° s1 ¡ 2° s2)
2
(s2 ¡ 4s1)
2 = 0; (83)
from which the indicated unregulated qualities (^ s1; ^ s2) can be deduced.




Proof: Substituting s2 ´ t ¢ s1 with t 2 (0;1] in (82), the ¯rst-order condition for ¯rm 1's
quality choice can equivalently be written as
s1 =
a (t2 ¡ 2t + 8)
(t3 + 4t2 ¡ 10t + 24) °
: (84)
The second-order condition is satis¯ed: using the rearranged ¯rst-order condition (84) and





24a (t5 ¡ 4t4 + 8t3 ¡ 16t2 + 20t ¡ 16) °
(t3 ¡ 6t2 + 16t ¡ 32) (t3 + 4t2 ¡ 10t + 24)
< 0: (85)




t 4 ¡ 4t3 + 26t2 + 16t ¡ 32
6t4 ¡ 36t3 + 60t2 ¡ 96t + 192
: (86)















2(~ s) = ~ s.




a2 (3t5 ¡ 22t4 + 103t3 ¡ 308t2 + 512t ¡ 256)
(t ¡ 4) (t3 + 4t2 ¡ 10t + 24)
2 ; (88)
which is positive (negative) to the left (right) of t = ^ s2=^ s1. By Lemma 4, we must have
t > ^ s2=^ s1 in equilibrium, i.e., (88) is negative and s¤
2(~ s) = ~ s becomes a boundary point
maximum.
Firm 2 has no incentive to leapfrog, i.e., to choose s0
2 ¸ s¤






1(~ s)). This decreases in the now lower quality s¤
1(~ s); namely, with









8a2 (t5 ¡ 6t4 + 28t3 ¡ 60t2 + 68t ¡ 32)
(t ¡ 4) (t3 + 4t2 ¡ 10t + 24)
2 < 0: (89)
s¤
1(~ s) satis¯es (84); hence s¤

















42a2 ¡ 361a° s0
2 + 361°2 s0
2
2¢2
361(7a ¡ 76° s0
2)
2 : (90)
The latter term is maximized by s0
2 = 7a
19° = smin
1 , corresponding to a quality ratio ® = 1.
In contrast, the reference pro¯t ¼2(s¤
1(~ s);s¤
2(~ s)) (see (67)), written as a function of the
equilibrium quality ratio ® 2 (^ s2=^ s1;1]
¦2(®) =
a3 ® (®2 ¡ 5® + 8) (®4 ¡ 7®3 + 26®2 ¡ 56® + 64)
(®3 + 4®2 ¡ 10® + 24)
3 °
; (91)
is minimized by ® = 1 and then equal to ¼L
2 (smin
1 ;smin


















> 0; ~ s · ~ sl ¼ 0:294426a
°
< 0; ~ s > ~ sl:
(92)
Proof: Firm 1's pro¯ts (see (66)) can be written as a function of the regulated equilibrium
quality ratio, using (84), as follows:
¦1(®) =
16a3 (®2 ¡ 2® + 2) (®4 ¡ 4®3 + 14®2 ¡ 20® + 16)
(®3 + 4®2 ¡ 10® + 24)
3 °
: (93)



















2 + 18® ¡ 16) < 0 (95)
using
^ s2

















= sign(¡®7 + 15®6 ¡ 75®5 + 236®4 ¡ 462®3 + +528®2 (97)
¡1184® + 768) (98)
where the latter is positive for ® < ®l and negative for ® ¸ ®l with ®l ¼ 0:79769. Finally,
® = ®l is equivalent to ~ s = ~ sl.
¤
















3 ° : (100)
















= sign(¡3®9 + 40®8 ¡ 266®7 + 1081®6 ¡ 3030®5 + 6178®4
¡10272®3 + 13472®2 ¡ 11520® + 4096):
(102)
Numerical inspection shows that
@§(®)
@® is positive for ® < ®m and negative for ® > ®m
with ®m ¼ 0:80944, where the latter corresponds to ~ sm ¼ 0:29887a
° .
Proposition 7
d(¼1(¢) + ¼2(¢) + S(¢))
d~ s
< 0: (103)
Proof: Total surplus expressed in terms of quality ratio ® is




3 ° : (105)

















= sign(¡11®9 + 112®8 ¡ 730®7 + 2689®6 ¡ 7046®5 + 13970®4
¡21280®3 + 29600®2 ¡ 32000® + 12288):
(107)
Numerical inspection shows that
@¡(®(~ s))




















Nash bargaining over aggregate collusion pro¯ts then yields (74) and (75).
An optimal deviation from (xc
1;xc









a + ° s1 ¡ ° s2
4
; (109)
and implies the pro¯ts in (76) and (77). Punishment pro¯ts ¼
p
i(s1;s2) are given by equa-







< 0; ~ s < ~ sb ¼ 0:29869a
°
> 0; ~ s > ~ sb:
(110)












(84), r1(s1;s2) and r2(s1;s2) can be written as functions of the regulated equilibrium quality
ratio ®:
½1(®) ´
®5 + 2®4 ¡ 130®3 + 448®2 ¡ 704® + 384
®5 + 16®4 ¡ 240®3 + 704®2 ¡ 960® + 512
; (111)
½2(®) ´
19®4 ¡ 10®3 ¡ 64®2 + 256® ¡ 128
3®2 (11®2 ¡ 40® + 64)
: (112)
As illustrated in Figure 4, the functions intersect at ® = ®b ¼ 0:80896 , which corresponds
to MQS ~ sb ¼ 0:29869a
° . If ® · ®b (® > ®b) ¯rm 1's (¯rm 2's) temptation to deviate is critical.
It is easy to see that
@½1(®)
@® < 0 and
@½2(®)
@® > 0. Using that ®(~ s) is strictly increasing in ~ s





> > > > > <
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@~ s | {z }
>0
> 0; ~ s > ~ sb:
(113)
24Figure 4: Critical discount factor for given equilibrium quality ratio
¤
Proposition 9 A welfare-enhancing MQS exists if ± 2 (± ¡; ¹ ±) for ± ¡ ¼ 0:54337 and ¹ ± ¼
0:69524.
Proof: For given a ± > r(^ s1; ^ s2) which makes collusion sustainable in an unregulated
equilibrium, an MQS ~ s induces competitive behavior whenever it implies an equilibrium













i½(®) ´ ±; (114)
where one obtains ± ¼ 0:54337 and ± ¼ 0:69524.
Total surplus rises relative to collusion with unregulated qualities for all regulated






3 ° ¡ b (115)
with b ¼ 0:0581843. Numerical inspection reveals that this is always positive.
¤
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